Graduate Student, Political Science
Thesis Title: Determinants of central bank independence in presidential systems: A two-level theory
Barry Ames (co-chair)
David Bearce (co-chair)
George Krause
Mark Hallerberg
About
My dissertation examines the determinants of central bank independence (CBI) in presidential systems. I focus on the interplay of domestic and international incentives for politicians to give up their control over monetary policy by providing central banks with more independence.
I argue that foreign investors and lenders demand CBI in developing countries as a signal of commitment to sound economic policy (Level 1). As the need for capital increases, so do the incentives for developing countries to comply with foreign demands for CBI. However, the capacity of a government to respond to international incentives and pressures through CBI is conditioned by the domestic institutional context (Level 2). Focusing on presidential systems, I argue that the strength of presidential powers, the quality of the legislative committee system, and the presence of divided government condition the elasticity of the government’s response to international incentives.
Contact Information
http://sites.google.com/site/carogarriga/
University of Pittsburgh
Department of Political Science
4600 Wesley W. Posvar Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
